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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ARTHUR R. JOHNSON and EVA
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

I
I
\

PEOPLES EINANCE & THRIFT
COMPANY, a corporation, et al
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 8024

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENTS OF FACTS
The respondents agree with the statement of facts set
out in appellants' brief with the additional fact that a second
stipulation was entered into between the parties on February
16, 1953, (R. 71-74), and the further fact that at the time
of the entering into the stipulation of May 23, 1952, and Feb.
16, 195 3, all the parties, including the plaintiffs, were present
in court with their attorneys and said parties were consulted
relative to the terms of said stipulation by their attorneys
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prior to the entry of the same, and they acquiesced in and agreed
to the terms of said stipulations prior to the entry of said
stipulations.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
The respondents will argue appellants' points in the order
in which they appear in appellants' brief.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE JUDGMENT IS NOT VOID BECAUSE
OF FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
6cl

Appellant contends that Rule 52 (a) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure make findings of fact and conclusions of
law by the court mandatory before entry of any valid judgment.
Respondent contends that the scope of Rule 52 (a) does not
include the type of judgment at issue, and that if it did, the
judgment is not ipso facto void, but is a valid and enforceable
obligation.
The scope of Rule 52 (a) is clearly defined in the first
sentence of the same.
Rule 52-Findings by the Court.
" (a) Effect. In all actions ffied upon the facts without
a jury or with an advisory jury, the courts shall, unless
the same are waived, :find the facts specially and state
separately its conclusions of law thereon and direct
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the entry of the appropriate judgment,
added).

* * * (Emphasis

The express wording of the rule includes only those actions "tried upon the facts." The reason for thus restricting
the application of the rule becomes apparent when the purpose of the rule is analyzed. However, suffice it to say that a
judgment entered pursuant to a stipulation of the parties is
not the product of an action "tried upon the facts." Instead,
a consent judgment (one entered for the purpose of executing
a settlement or compromise of an action) is a contract of the
parties acknowledged in open court and ordered to be recorded.
It is not a judicial determination or a judgment of the court
except in the sense that the court allows it to go upon the
record and have the force and effect of a judgment. The only
inquiry of the court is whether the parties have in fact agreed
as to the terms of the judgment.
(See: 49 C.J.S. 308 ( 1947))
31 Am. Jur. 105, 107 (1940))
3· Freeman, Judgments § 1350 ( 1925))
It is thus apparent that the scope of Rule 52 (a) does not
include the consent judgment, as in such a case there has been
no judicial inquiry into the facts of the controversy. The parties
in the instant case stipulated to the terms of a compromise,
but there was no agreed statement of facts. It is difficult to
see how the court could find the facts even if it had attempted
to, without a trial upon the merits. Since a determination of the
facts of the controversy and conclusions of law drawn from
such facts was not the basis of the judgment, any findings of
fact in the same matter would not only be unnecessary, but
objectionable.
~··
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This argument is more convincing in the light of the purpose of the adoption of Rule 52 (a) . A leading commentary
upon the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, from which the
Utah rules were adapted, says in regard to the federal rule:
(Barron & Holtzoff 2 Federal Practice and Procedure, Rules
Edition, 809)

]:

The purpose of Rule 52 (a) is to aid the appellate
court by affording it a clear understanding of the
ground or basis of the decision of the trial court.
Interpreting this rule, the court, in United States v. Institute
of Carpet Manufacturers of America, ( 1 F.R.D. 636 (Dist.
Ct. S. D.) stated:
The apparent reason for the adoption of the rule
in question was so that an appellate court might be informed on the grounds for the decision rendered by
the court from which the appeal was taken. The rule
is intended to aid the appellate court by affording a
clear understanding of the basis of the decision of the
trial court. (Citing cases).
and citing Goodacre v. Panagopoulos, (72 App. D. C. 25,
110 F. 2d 377, 382)
Like its predecessor, Equity Rule 70:Yz, Rule 52 (a)
is intended to aid appellate courts by affording them
a clear understanding of the basis of the decision below.
We have held that, when this clear understanding is
afforded, the judgment may stand although the rule
is violated.
This statement by one of our Federal District Courts is even
more significant when one realizes that there is not even a provision for waiver of findings and conclusions in the federal
rules, as there is in the Utah rules.

6
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Our Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Wade in
Mower v. McCarthy, (245 P. 2d 224), casts some light upon
the purpose of the rule at issue: (Pgs. 226, 227)

[J

\~

.,
~-

~

In every case involving disputed issues of fact, findings of such facts are helpful to the reviewing court
and should be made when requested and findings
which meet the approval of the trier of facts are
purposed.
The judgment in the instant case was entered pursuant to
stipulation of the parties, and the judgment itself so indicates
(R. 53). There was no trial upon the facts by the trial court.
There was no finding of fact which was made by the trial
court, or which could have been made in light of the stipulation. It is clear that the basis of the decision of the trial court
was the stipulation, and findings of fact would serve no purpose at all in clarifying for an appellate court the basis of the
decision. Findings have weight with the appellate court when
they represent the trial court's appraisal of the candor and
credibility of witnesses and are based upon oral testimony.
In this case, even if there had been such testimony, it could
not have been relevant because the parties stipulated to a
settlement. The judgment was entered only after two appearancs of the parties in open court, and a mutual agreement as
to the terms of settlement of the dispute. There were no witnesses called, no documentary evidence presented for the court
to pass upon, and no testimony whatsoever to be appraised by
the trier of facts.
It is elementary that when a judgment is based upon an
agreement of the parties there are no material issues to be
7
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decided by the trial court. Further, even in contested matters
tried upon the facts, the failure to make findings upon immaterial issues, or issues which would not affect the judgment
of the court is not ground for reversal. (Sheppick v. Sheppick
ct al., 44 Utah 131, 138 P. 1169).
Appellant cites two Utah cases to support his argument
that the judgment is without validity because of the absence
of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The first of these,
Thomas v. Farrell, 82 Utah 532, 26 P. 2d 328 (19}3)) was
tried on the facts wilthout a jury. The court in holding that
it was error for the trial court to fail to make findings on a
matter at issue affirmed the familiar rule that "findings must
respond to, and cover, the matter at issue raised by the pleadings." Justice Folland did not say that in a case where there
are no material issues for the court to decide because of a
stipulation of the parties, the judgment will be void without
written findings of fact. The second case cited by appellant
is likewise distinguishable in that it was an appeal from a
decision after a trial including the presentation of evidence
and testimony.
Our Supreme Court has recognized that findings of fact
and conclusions of law are not an essential to every valid
judgment. In Young v. Ellett, ( 146 P. 2d 196) the court said
(at page 198):
"There are final judgments where no findings of fact
or conclusions of law need or can be made ... There
are others in which the record is complete and no findings c~~ld be made other than those found in the
record.
8
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In the same opinoin, Mr. Chief Justice Wolfe said (Concurring
at Page 199) :

"If a judgment is not supported by findings and
conclusions, it would seem that it should nevertheless
be good as against collateral attack and capable of enforcement despite what was said in Hillyard v. District
Court, 68 Utah 220, 249 P. 806. It would seem that a
judgment would be void only where there was no power
to render it."
Again, in Wright v. Union Pacific RR Co., (22 Utah
338, 62 P. 372) the Court indicated that findings of fact
are required only in a trial on the merits. Baird v. Upper
Canal Irrigation Company (75 Utah 57, 257 P. 1060) limits
the requirements of findings to "contested cases."

n:

The Federal District Court for the Southern District was
confronted with substantially the same problem in United
States v. Institute of Carpet Manufacturers of America, supra,
as is now before this court. The parties to the suit had stipulated
to a settlement of their dispute. The case came before the
court on an application for the entry of a decree on the stipulation. In granting the application, the court pointed out that
findings of fact and conclusions of law by the court were not
essential pre-requisites to· the entry of a valid judgment.
A "Trial" is a judicial examination of the issues.
( 42 Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, 482, 533).
In Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Goldstein, ( 43 F. Supp. 767 (1942) the court said with regard to
Rule 52 of the Federal Rules (Pg. 768):

9
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"This rule provides that findings be made by the
~ourt in ~ll actions "tried" upon the facts without a
~ury. ~htle summary judgment may dispose of all the
~ssues m the action, the proceedings upon which it

ts based cannot be regarded as a trial, nor are the
issues "tried"."
Again, in Pen-Ken Oil & Gas Corporation v. Warfield
Natural Gas Co., 2 F.R.D. 355 ( 1942) the court stated (Pg.
355}:
"In my opinion Rule 52 applies to a case upon final
hearing and submission. The ruling here is not made
on the case upon final submission on the law and facts.
The ruling here is on defendant's motion for summary
judgment."
This court is not hampered in its ability to appraise the
judgment of the trial court by absence of findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The basis of the judgment is clear. This
appeal is not taken from the trial court's decision of the facts.
This court would be in no manner aided in making a decision
on this appeal by findings and conclusions. No right of the
appellant had been infringed as a result of the trial court's
failure to find specifically the facts on each issue that might
have been raised had the case gone to trial. Further, applications of the rule of negative implication, a common principle
of statutory construction, excludes the possibility that Rule 52
(a) is designed to require findings and conclusions in cases
which are not tried upon the facts.
Since there is no necessity for findings and conclusions,
in the instant case, it is immaterial whether there was a waiver
of the same as provided for in Rule 52 (a).
10
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POINT II. THE JUDGMENT IS NOT VOID BECAUSE
THE JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED UPON STIPULATION
AND THERE WAS NO NECESSITY FOR A PRE TRIAL
ORDER, AND SAID JUDGMENT IS IN ACCORDANCE
WITH SAID STIPULATION.
...'•

:;:

,_, ..
~··

The purpose of the rule directing the trial court to enter
a pre-trial order is apparent. A trial court may eliminate unnecessary issues, analyze and settle the pleadings by amendments, eliminate matters of proof by admissions and stipulations, etc. The pre trial order is to designate the results of the
conference and direct the subsequent conduct of the trial.
Appellant properly states the purpose of the order as being
a guide to the parties.
However, it cannot be honestly argued that the court is
without power to enter a judgment at the close of a pre trial
conference. (This point is too well established to require
citation of cases) . In this event then, what is left to be the
subject of a further order? The judgment in the instant case
certainly did not leave the parties in a position to argue over
the meaning of the stipulation. The terms of the judgment
are clear and understandable. The court directed each party
to respond in the manner that they had agreed to in their
stipulations. Whether the decree of the court is called a judgment or a pre trial order or a brown horse is not significant
It is enough to say that it included all of the results of the pre
trial conference, and directed the settlement of the controversy.
It is difficult to see the point of appellants' argument that
the stipulation was never meant to be the basis of a pre trial
11
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order or of a judgment. The appellate court might well ask
why the parties went to the trouble of making a stipulation in
open court if it were not their intent to make a final settlement
of the dispute and have it a matter of judicial record with the
force and effect of a judgment. It would have been a simple
matter for all of the parties to the action to make a settlement
out of court if they had never intended that their agreement
be given the status of a court order.
Appellant's argument that it was the intention of all of
the parties and the court that the only action by the court would
be the granting of the "petition to dismiss" the action comes
as a surprise to the other parties. This argument, which is
raised for the first time on appeal, has little weight in light
of the chain of events preceding the final judgment.
The Johnsons point out the language of the court (R. 46)
as an indication that the stipulation was never intended to
become part of an order of the court. It is a matter of record
that the judgment was entered only after a second hearing
of the parties (R. 71-74) on the objections to the proposed
judgment, and a further stipulation which at the time settled
all differences of the parties. Appellants later moved to set
aside this stipulation, not on the grounds that the stipulation
was ambiguous or indefinite, but that it was entered into improvidently, inadvertently and mistakenly. Only after two
hearings, and two stipulations did the court sign the judgment embodying the terms of the agreement. There was certainly no question in the mind of the court as to the intent of
the parties.
Appellants next argue that the judgment entered does
12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

:DI

::o:

l:ll

not conform with the stipulation. The only fact argued in
appellant's brief to support this point is that Paragraph 2
(R. 54) of the judgment provides for a conveyance by plaintiffs of part of their land by Warranty Deed and a contract
of sale for tlre balance. Appellant then states that where the
court can find this in the stipulation is beyond comprehension.
An examination of the judgment shows that plaintiff is to
convey by Warranty Deed to defendant Finlayson certain described land. Paragraph 1 of the judgment (R. 53) provides
that the balance is to be the subject of a uniform real estate
contract with plaintiff as seller and defendant Finlayson as
buyer. One need only read the stipulation to comprehend that
the following was part of the stipulation (R. 44, 45) :
MR. BACKMAN: The Plaintiffs Arthur Johnson
and Eva Johnson, his wife, allow Ebba E. Finlayson
a claim of One Thousand Dollars on the uniform real
estate contract and will convey to Ebba Finlayson the
property west of the Fassie tract-isn't that it?
MR. BAYLE: Yes, straight west.
MR. BACKMAN: . . . running the full depth of
the property, and a new contract will then be entered
into with Ebba Finlayson describing the balance of the
property within the fence lines.

.;r'

The property described in paragraph 2 (R. 54) of the judgment is the property west of the Fassie tract. Paragraph 1 (R.
53) of the judgment describes the balance of the Johnsons'
property which was to be the subject of a real estate contract
as provided for in the stipulation. It is unfair to the trial
court to state that it is beyond comprehension where he could
find this part of the judgment in the stipulation.
13
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POINT III. THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
VACATE THE STIPULATION ENTERED INTO AT THE
PRE TRIAL HEARING ON MAY 23, 1952, AND IN FAILING TO SET THE ACTION DOWN FOR TRIAL.
The plaintiff contends that the court abused its discretion in failing to vacate the stipulation entered into May 23,
1952. The only evidence to support such a contention is a selfserving affidavit signed on March 4, 1953 (R. 51-52). The
court will note that the plaintiff delayed making such a contention for a period of more than nine months after the stipulation was entered into. Upon notice of objection to the entry
of judgment, a second stipulation was entered into between
the parties on February 16, 1953 (R. 71-74) and plaintiff
raises no objection to this stipulation.

~
:~

-

;:n

j)::J

:~

The affidavit raises six ( 6) objections:

( 1) That the description of the land should conform to
the description as determined by George W. Cassidy. There is
nothing in the plaintiffs' pleading to indicate that such was
to be the method of determining the description (R. 54).
There is also no evidence presented by the plaintiff to show
that the descriptions of the land do not conform to the survey

t)lt

made by George W. Cassidy.

( 2) That the new contract would call for the same terms
of payment as the old contract. The new contract does recite
the same terms of payment as the old contract (R. 19 showing
copy of old contract, and R. 54 showing payments under the
judgment).
14
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( 3·) That plaintiffs 'attorney was not informed that plaintiffs were not in the chain of title as grantors of the property
now in possession of Reid and Kartchner. The original action
is to quiet title to the property described in plaintiffs' complaint (R. 8-9) which included the tract of land now in possession of Reid and Kartchner. In determining that plaintiff
had an interest in said property, plaintiffs' attorney would
of necessity have to determine that his client either was in
the chain of title or had a paramount title because of adverse
possession, purchase at tax sale, or for some use or title paramount to that of the defendants. Plaintiffs' attorney, at the
time of commencement of the action, was also a licensed
abstractor and certainly knew all of the facts pertaining to
the titles of all the tracts of land involved.
( 4) That the land held by Reid and Kartchner had not
been held adversely against the plaintiffs. The defendants had
no opportunity to prove their claims as the case was settled
by stipulation of the attorneys for the various parties in court
at which time all parties were present.
i '-

( 5) That the amount to be received from Reid and
Kartchner was disproportionate to the amount plaintiffs allowed Finlayson. The determination of amounts was on an
entirely different basis. The amount Kartchner and Reid were
to pay was to reimburse plaintiff for taxes he had inadvertently
paid on property owned by Reid and Kartchner. The amoun ~
of credit to Finlayson was for a shortage of land to which h~
was entitled under the terms of his contract and had no relation whatsoever to the amounts fixed for reimbursement by
Reid and Kartchner.

15
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( 6) That plaintiff did not understand they were to convey
any property to Finlayson. This part of the stipulation of May
2 3, 195 2, was dictated by plaintiffs' attorney (R. A4-45), said
stipulation being made at a time when the plaintiffs were
p<:rsonally present in court and they were personally consulted
prior to the making of said stipulation by their attorney.
The stipulation was certain, unambiguous and fully concurred in after due deliberation by the attorneys for all the
parties and its terms were never changed by further stipulations, said second stipulation being an additional term for
settlement of the issues between the parties. Said stipulation
was in all respects fairly and fully made and agreed upon by
all the parties to said action and should not be avoided by this
court.
Appellants have cited 50 American Jurisprudence, 614
Paragraph 14, with respect to the granting of relief from stipulation. The citation, among other things, recited: "That upon
appeal, the determination of the trial court as to the propriety
of granting such relief will not ordinarily be interfered with
except where a manifest abuse of discretion is disclosed . . .
Parties will not be relieved from stipulations in absence of a
clear showing that the fact or facts stipulated are untrue, and
then only when the application for such relief is seasonably
made and good cause is shown for the granting of such relief."
The Utah Supreme Court, in the recent case of Warren vs.
Dixon Ranch Company, 260 P.2d 741, recited the rule that
the court on appeal will reverse the trial court, only where an
abuse of its discretionary power is clearly shown. The appellant has not shown nor has he attempted to sho\\7, that any
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of the facts contained in the stipulation were untrue, nor has
he shown any facts indicating that the lower court was guilty
of a manifest abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION
Respondents contend that the judgment was entered into
upon the full knowledge of all of the parties and their attorneys and after two lengthy discussions with the court, that all
parties knew all of the facts contained therein and agreed to
the stipulations prior to the time they were entered into.
For the reasons herein stated, the judgment of the lower
court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
GRANT MACFARLANE
Attorneys for Respondents Andrew Reid et ux and
Ebba Finlayson
351 Union Pacific Annex Bldg.,
Salt Lake City, Utah
F. ROBERT BAYLE
Attorney for Respondents Francis B. Johnson, et ux
Utah Oil Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah
DAVID H. BYBEE,
Respondents A. R. Kartchner, et ux,
Judge Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondents
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